The technological, economic and policy dimensions of climate change are essential to understanding and formulating corporate strategic responses. Over the past decade, advances in greenhouse gas mitigation technologies, the refinement of economic models and their underlying assumptions, and the emergence of emissions trading and other market-based policy instruments have improved understanding of the potential of innovative technologies and policies to limit the costs of reducing emissions. These developments, accompanied by growing scientific evidence of climate risks and vulnerabilities and building political momentum toward binding emissions requirements, have prompted an increase in and diversification of corporate responses. This paper provides an overview of emerging business strategies to address climate change, focusing on engagement with international negotiations and the design and implementation of Kyoto mechanisms. Responses are differentiated by sector and region, revealing evidence of divergence, prospects for convergence and the importance of leadership.
Evolving technologies and economics
Lowering global greenhouse gas emissions will require major changes in existing patterns of energy resource development. Fortunately, the potential of new technologies and policies to slow climate change has grown dramatically over the past decade. In its 2001 Third Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) observes that-since the panel's previous report, in 1995-'significant progress relevant to greenhouse gas emissions reduction has been made and has been faster than anticipated' (see Metz et al. 2001) . The IPCC reports advances in a wide range of technologies at varying stages of development. These include the market introduction of wind turbines, the elimination of industrial by-product gases, the emergence of highly efficient hybrid-electric cars, and the advance of fuel-cell technology.
The IPCC also points to a range of technologies that are already cost-effective. Summarising hundreds of studies, it concludes that global emissions could be reduced well below 2000 levels between 2010 and 2020-by 1.9-2.6 billion tonnes of carbon equivalent by 2010, and by 3.6-5.5 billion tonnes by 2020. (Currently, emissions are projected to reach 11.5-14 billion tonnes by 2010 and 12-16 billion tonnes by 2010.) The panel found that half of the reductions by 2020 could be achieved in cost-effective fashion (Metz et al. 2001) .
The low-cost opportunities lie predominantly in the hundreds of technologies and practices that promote efficient energy use in buildings, transportation and manufacturing. In addition, natural gas is expected to play an important role in tandem with power plant efficiency improvements and greater use of co-generation (the combined use of heat and power). Important contributions can also be made by low-carbon energy systems, such as biomass from forestry and agricultural by-products, landfill methane, wind and solar power, hydropower and other renewable sources of energy. However, the short-term potential for some options, such as solar power, is limited by high costs.
The potential also exists for reducing other greenhouse gases within agriculture and industry. Methane and nitrous oxide emissions can be cut from livestock fermentation, rice paddies, nitrogen fertiliser use and animal wastes, while process changes and the use of alternative compounds can minimise the emissions of fluorinated gases.
Using these available or near-ready technologies, most models suggest that atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) concentrations could be stabilised at 450-550 parts per million volume-which some scientists consider to be the range for avoiding dangerous climate change-or lower, over the next 100 years (Metz et al. 2001) . Bringing this about, however, would require major socioeconomic and institutional changes. It would imply an accelerated decoupling of economic development and carbon emissions, or 'decarbonisation' and reduction in carbon intensity. And it would necessitate that the supply and conversion of energy no longer be dominated by low-priced fossil fuels.
Analyses of the costs and benefits of cutting emissions vary widely, given different methodologies and underlying assumptions. Estimates depend, for example, on whether the revenue of carbon taxes is recycled back into the economy through reductions in other taxes; whether the ancillary benefits of mitigating climate change-energy savings, reduced local and regional air pollution, energy security and employment-are factored in; and whether the external costs and damages of climate change are incorporated into market prices. Other assumptions shaping models of the economics of climate change include demographic, economic and technological trends; the level and timing of the agreed target; and the degree of reliance on various implementation measures, such as emissions trading. John Weyant of Stanford notes that varying assumptions explain why cost projections vary across models by a factor of two to four (Weyant 2000) .
There is a consensus among experts that some greenhouse gas emissions can be limited at no cost-or even at a net benefit-to society through 'no regrets' policies that address imperfections in the market. Lack of information can prevent consumers and businesses from adopting efficient technologies that lower overall energy costs. If carbon taxes or auctioned emissions permits are used to finance reduced income and labour taxes, the benefits become larger. Several studies employing this 'double dividend' show a net or negative mitigation cost. The ancillary benefits can in some instances balance out the costs of the policies themselves: reducing carbon emissions can also provide major human health benefits through lower emissions of particulates, ozone, and nitrogen and sulphur oxides.
Government studies have reinforced the potential for low-cost or no-cost emissions cuts. A US Department of Energy study estimated that the nation could meet the majority of its Kyoto target at no net cost, primarily by removing market barriers to the adoption of energy-efficient and renewable energy technologies (see Interlaboratory Working Group 2000). The policies would also reduce air pollution, petroleum dependence and inefficiencies in energy use, leading to economic benefits comparable to overall costs. The Climate Change Programme of the European Union has concluded that the region could achieve its target through cost-effective measures-primarily involving energy efficiency-amounting to no more than $18 per tonne of carbon dioxide, or 0.6% of the region's GDP (see ECCP 2001) .
Another area of broad consensus among economists is that allowing emissions trading between countries would reduce costs. Without emissions trading between Annex B countries, global studies show reductions in projected GDP of 0.2-2.0% in 2010. With full emissions trading, the reductions would be 0.1-1.1%-likely to be lost in the noise of natural variations in the economy.
According to conventional economic models, the cost of reducing emissions rises as the target for stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations drops. But these models ignore the potential of ambitious targets to bring about deep technological change by spurring industry to make large rather than incremental innovations. Models that account for this 'induced technological change' suggest that stabilisation of carbon dioxide concentrations and GDP growth need not be a zero-sum game. But many studies, including the integrated assessment models, continue to make unrealistic assumptions about market forces, technological innovation and company behaviour that drive up the estimated cost of dealing with climate change (see Dunn 2002) .
The most important point of corporate relevance regarding the economics of climate change is that, however the costs and benefits add up, they will be spread unevenly among different sectors of the economy, and even potentially within sectors. It is easier to identify the sectors likely to face economic costs than to pinpoint those that may benefit. In addition, the costs are more immediate, concentrated and certain, even if the benefits prove to be greater. Coal, oil and certain energy-intensive sectors-such as chemicals, paper and steel production-are most likely to suffer an economic disadvantage. Others, including the renewable energy industry, are expected to benefit over the long term from price changes and the availability of financial and other resources that might otherwise have been committed to carbon-intensive energy sectors. But, while these firms are relative newcomers to the policy process, the companies that stand to lose the most-at least in the short term-have from the beginning been the most prominent and influential business voices in the climate negotiations.
Business engagement with negotiations
The evolving technology and economics of the climate issue form an important backdrop to business engagement with international negotiations. Trade associations opposing emissions limits, such as the Global Climate Coalition, initially employed the argument that climate change mitigation would inflict significant economic damage. However, past evidence of overstating the costs of environmental protection, accumulating evidence of the costs of inaction, and the apparent effectiveness of market-based instruments such as emissions trading eventually made these economic arguments less viable. For these and other reasons, between 1997 and 2000, BP, DuPont, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Texaco and General Motors withdrew from the group, which closed its doors to individual companies in 2002 (see Dunn and Flavin 2002) .
In addition to the changing technological and economic outlook, the momentum of the policy process-and the opportunity to influence implementation rules-has prompted the formation of business groups more constructively engaged with negotiations. Thirtyseven companies, including BP, Boeing, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Intel, Shell, United Technologies and Whirlpool, have joined the Business Environmental Leadership Council of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, which supports the Protocol as 'a first step in the international process to address climate change' and agrees that 'Businesses can and should take concrete steps now in the US and abroad to assess opportunities for emission reduction, establish and meet emission reduction objectives, and invest in new, more efficient products, practices and technologies.' Other groups stating support for the Kyoto Protocol include the EU-Japan Business Dialogue, the US and European Business Councils for Sustainable Energy, the US-based Social Venture Network and 'emission 55', a coalition of 150 European and Japanese firms, including Deutsche Telekom and the insurance firm Gerling Group.
For some companies, the economic risks had long become apparent. Insurance and reinsurance companies are confronted with enormous liabilities from rising weatherrelated claims. German reinsurer Munich Re estimates that climate change could cost $300 billion annually by 2050, through weather damage and impacts on industry and agriculture (see Cortese 2002) . These entities have become active participants in the UN talks. The World Resources Institute estimates that shareholders in leading oil and gas companies may lose 6% or more of the value of their investments because of regulatory efforts to address climate change. Innovest Strategic Advisors estimates that about 15% of the total market capitalisation of major companies could be placed at risk by climate change (Cortese 2002) . As these risks have been better quantified, the financial sector's perceived self-interest in negotiations has risen.
Overall, corporate positions have revealed a transatlantic divide (see Levy and Newell 2000) , resulting from differing government policies and views on the economic feasibility of reducing emissions. Through late 2002, the fallback position of most European companies had been to support the Protocol, while in the US most companies had remained silent. This has created rifts within some companies. Ford has opposed Kyoto, while its Volvo Car unit has supported it. Coca-Cola belongs to the US Council for International Business, which has not endorsed the pact, while a Spanish subsidiary has stated, 'We are in line with the general idea of the Kyoto Protocol . . . It's the price of entry [to an emissions trading system]' (see Ball 2001) .
By and large, business groups in Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand have followed the cue of their counterparts in the US. But the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol process in early 2001 has weakened their stance and their ability to counteract political will. This was demonstrated in 2002, when parliaments in Japan, Canada and New Zealand all ratified the Protocol over trade association complaints. Thus the resistant element of business engagement has seen its negotiating clout diminish, while the more pragmatic elements have sought with growing success to influence the terms of the debate.
Business engagement with flexibility mechanisms
In addition to influencing government policy individually and through trade associations, business responses to climate change include a range of internal and external control measures. Internal controls include greenhouse gas inventory and management systems; internal greenhouse gas reduction targets; internal emissions trading systems; consideration of climate change in outside investments; and research and investment into energy efficiency, fuel switching and new technologies. BP and Shell have, for example, established internal cap-and-trade systems for all their business units.
Indeed, involvement in trading or other flexibility mechanisms is becoming a common external control. Over the past five years, governments have increasingly accepted emissions trading as a policy of choice to address climate change. At the same time, progress in the international negotiations and the increasing likelihood of emissions limitations have driven the emergence of a market for greenhouse gas emissions. This trend toward greenhouse gas trading is motivated by both economic theory and empirical evidence, notably the successes of the US sulphur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions trading programme that was incorporated in the acid rain programme of the 1990 US Clean Air Act Amendments. The cap-and-trade programme, which has created a $4 billion market, has helped reduce SO 2 emissions much faster, and at lower cost, than expected: emissions in 2010 are projected to be roughly half their 1980 levels. While the cost to industry is estimated at $1 billion per year, the health benefits are projected to reach $50 billion by 2010 (see Murphy 2002) .
While the sulphur emissions trading market arose from legislation, the early greenhouse gas emissions market has come in advance of finalised government rules. Motivations for firms to trade are similar to those for adopting climate response strategies in general: demonstrating environmental leadership, learning-by-doing, hedging and managing risk, and generating revenue. According to the global energy brokerage firm Natsource, an estimated 200 million tonnes of CO 2 equivalent (CO 2 e) were traded between mid-1997 and mid-2002 . (This number includes trades of reductions as well as financial derivatives based on reductions, but excludes internal corporate trades and small trades of less than 1,000 tonnes of CO 2 e.) Some of this involvement may be related to bullish estimates of the size of the greenhouse gas (GHG) market, which have been furnished by potential beneficiaries. The World Bank, which is developing a Prototype Carbon Fund, predicts a $10 billion market by 2005. Corinne Boone of CO2e.com, a division of Cantor Fitzgerald with a 24 hour Internet trading marketplace, expects a fully commoditised GHG market by 2010. Her firm estimates that the EU emissions trading market alone could be generating $7 billion in annual trading volume by the time it matures in 2012.
The greenhouse gas market is evolving in fragmented fashion, however, as few governments have formalised trading rules. It has arisen from project-based emissions trading programmes, which have been voluntary but may serve as precursors to formal regulations. The market has also emerged from a number of public and private trading programmes under development in Europe and North America. While a number of private firms, such as Ontario Power and US Gen, have experimented with early trading, their experience indicates that a lack of clear trading rules has increased transaction costs and prevented the emergence of a robust trading market. Uncertainty about rules seth dunn and the size of future caps has also limited demand, keeping trading prices low and limiting impact on corporate investment decisions.
While the Danish and UK systems are spurring trading activity, they also reveal the drawbacks of concurrently developing systems. The Danish and UK systems trade different gases, encompass different sectors and use different blends of allowance-and credit-based trading. Nonetheless, the first trade between these two schemes was recorded in May 2002, between Royal Dutch/Shell and Elsam, Denmark's largest electricity generator and the first company to trade under the Danish system in December 2001 (see Buchan 2002) . Some experts viewed this swap as evidence that firms could trade government-backed emissions allowances between jurisdictions, even in the absence of clear rules.
The British system, launched in April 2002, is the first to cover all six greenhouse gases. Firms may participate in a variety of ways, from purely voluntary participation to agreements with government that yield energy tax exemptions and financial incentives. Thirty-four organisations across the finance, energy, manufacturing and automotive sectors-including Barclays, BP, Shell and Rolls Royce-voluntarily assumed a legally binding obligation to reduce emissions against 1998-2000 levels (see DEFRA 2002b and Table 1 ). The scheme, expected to eventually deliver reductions of over 4 million tonnes of CO 2 e annually, was in September 2002 reporting two or three trades per day and an average size of 7,500 tonnes of CO 2 e (Murphy 2002) . But, as some observers anticipated, the UK programme-due to its voluntary nature-suffers from adverse selection: net sellers likely to generate excess permits were predominant among those that signed up, while potential buyers have largely refrained. After rising steadily to $20, prices dropped in late 2002 to below $7 due to oversupply of credits.
The mandatory EU system, approved in December 2002, may begin to lessen the fragmentation and improve policy certainty for companies when it begins in 2005 (see Rosenzweig et al. 2002) . The European Commission has acknowledged that its differences in sectors and gases covered (only CO 2 ) could create market distortions, and that the UK system would have to be modified to transfer smoothly to the EU programme. Analysts fear incompatibilities from differences in design may inhibit firms from taking GMI (Dunn and Flavin 2002) . Sixteen members of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change's Business Environment Leadership Council have set corporate greenhouse gas targets, with trading an important motivation (see Margolick and Russell 2001) .
Corporate-led efforts have also appeared. The Emissions Market Development Group, including Credit Lyonnais, Swiss Re and other firms, is creating a 'carbon repository' to which companies deposit achieved reductions, and which increases the liquidity of early trading by assigning exchange rates in proportion to the risks of the reductions and issuing credits redeemable for future compliance. Insurance firm members believe, however, that the creation of insurance products to guarantee reductions will be critical to the entity's success (Rosenzweig et al. 2002) .
Another private-led GHG emissions trading initiative is the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), which began in early 2003. The exchange's design phase included 28 North American GHG-emitting companies, as well as municipalities, offset providers and financial service providers (see Sandor 2002a) . The CCX's 14 founding members have committed, as must future members, to reducing GHG emissions by 2% below 1999 levels during 2002 and reducing them by 1% annually thereafter, with credits given for domestic and international offsets (see Table 2 ). Corporate involvement is driven in part by expectations of future US government regulations, though the CCX itself has applied for regulatory coverage by the National Association of Securities Dealers. Chairman Richard Sandor intends to expand the CCX internationally (Sandor 2002b) .
Growing corporate engagement with project-based mechanisms-AIJ and CDM-is also evident. Programmes are progressing from pilot phases for gaining market experience to potential mechanisms for achieving voluntary commitments, hedging risk and complying with emissions limits. While governed by differing rules, they adhere to a de facto set of criteria. They include the pilot phase of the international AIJ programme, pilot programmes in the US and Canada, the Dutch government's Emission Reduction Unit Procurement Tender and the World Bank's Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF).
As of 2002, 155 AIJ projects had been undertaken in 41 countries-roughly 80% involving renewable energy and energy efficiency (Rosenzweig et al. 2002) . The Dutch programme has bought more than 4 million tonnes of CO 2 e reductions for roughly $30 million for projects such as co-generation in Romania and a wind park in Poland. The PCF intends to 'demonstrate convincingly that there is significant private sector interest in the emerging market for emissions reductions under JI and the CDM' (World Bank 2002a). As of mid-2002, members included five national governments and 17 companies from the electric power, energy, finance and trade sectors, and 31 host-country committee members (see Table 3 ). Twelve projects were under review, including those for renewable energy in Costa Rica and biomass in Bulgaria.
Businesses are working to address concerns that carbon finance would bypass smaller projects in the poorest countries. The World Bank and the International Emissions Trading Association-a non-profit group of 50 companies involved in negotiations over flexibility mechanisms-have begun a Community Development Carbon Fund (CDCF), which will finance greenhouse gas emissions reductions from small projects in 64 developing countries. The first initiative to target small-scale projects through the CDM, the CDCF will work through local intermediaries and NGOs to lower transaction costs and risks and has formal support from a dozen governments and firms, including Swiss Re, TransAlta and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (see World Bank 2002b) .
As these markets emerge, economic models will give way to real-world corporate experience through actual market performance data. A 2002 Natsource study inter- As the authors note, 'it is hardly surprising that many market participants beat the price predictions of so many early modelers and analysts, as occurred in the performance of the US acid rain programme in comparison to early modeling predictions' (Natsource 2002). The Natsource study assesses the prices of the market transactions to date (see Table  4 ). Reviewing the corporate interviews and price trends, Natsource expects pre-Kyoto prices (2005) to remain below $5 per tonne of CO 2 e globally, and between $2.50 and $9 in Europe. For Kyoto-period prices (2010), the firm expects prices between $5 and $11, with $9 as a best estimate.
GMI
As this study suggests, corporate expectations of the GHG market range somewhat. In considering whether to engage with this market, companies must contend with major policy uncertainties and price volatility, as well as transaction costs and the possibility of anti-competitive behaviour. At the same time, the growing likelihood of a GHGregulated business environment and the need to manage risk exposure suggest that experimentation with trading will continue. In the short term, however, market fragmentation and the absence of harmonised rules may prevent a more active market. These barriers both explain and are explained by sectoral and regional differences within the private sector.
Sectoral and regional differentiation
Differences by sectors and regions are related to the perceived risk that climate policy poses to a firm. Sectors considered to face the highest risk are electricity and energy supply. Companies in these sectors, not coincidentally, have been the most active in influencing negotiations, setting internal targets and experimenting with trading. Energy-intensive firms also perceive serious risks, but some view them as manageable. The financial and services sectors see relatively little risk, and the potential for gain by providing services or products to mitigate climate change. The perception of risk has a geographical component. North American firms anticipate more risk than competitors in Europe and Asia, who see the risk as relatively manageable. In general, most firms believe that they can handle prices at $5/tonne CO 2 e and below, though risks increase more quickly with rising prices for the electricity, energy supply and energy-intensive sectors.
Corporate expectations of pricing, which are related to concerns over obstacles to efficient trading, can also be differentiated geographically. Prices in Europe are expected to be the same as or somewhat higher than the global price, due to concerns that restrictions will be placed on trading or companies will not exploit efficient trading opportunities. Japanese prices are also anticipated to be higher than global prices, due to the country's ambitious target and its industry's hesitation about trading. Prices in Canada are expected to be close to the global price, as its market is expected to function effectively. Russian prices are expected to be lower than the global average, due to excess permits. And US prices are anticipated to be lower, due to weaker policies-a belief held most strongly by North American companies.
Variation within sectors is evident as well. The energy supply sector includes firms actively engaged in, as well as firms notably disengaged from, the Kyoto mechanisms. In terms of involvement in government trading schemes and offset projects, there is a continuum from BP and Shell (most engaged) to Elf and ChevronTexaco (somewhat engaged) to ExxonMobil (least engaged). (ExxonMobil has maintained opposition to the Kyoto pact and pushed for changes in the leadership of the IPCC.) The European-headquartered firms are more involved than their American counterparts with international mechanisms and have more fully established processes for corporate target-setting and internal emissions trading systems.
The same pattern holds with long-term energy sources. BP and Shell have both made significant investments in renewable energy-BP Solar has reported profits since 2000-and in hydrogen and fuel-cell technology. ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil, which abandoned solar research in the 1980s, have made forays into fuel-cell investments. External pressure may spur further convergence. Following a boycott of UK subsidiary Esso and US shareholder pressure, ExxonMobil announced in 2002 a major fund for energy and climate research at Stanford University, acknowledging that, despite the uncertainties of climate science, moves to reduce risk may be justified (see Herrick 2002) .
Convergence is more evident in the automotive sector, due to the intensity of global competition, local air-quality drivers, and long-term market opportunities of low-GHG vehicles-with the emergent dynamic less a 'transatlantic divide' than a 'Pacific threat'. US-based multinationals were highly resistant to the Kyoto talks, but in the aftermath moved from impeding to influencing the negotiations as they gained momentum. Carmaking companies have become involved in trading experiments (Ford, Rolls Royce). Most visibly, firms have made major investments in hybrid-electric and fuel-cell vehicles. Through an ambitious technological strategy, Japanese car-makers have outpaced US firms in hybrid vehicle development and appear to be doing the same with fuel-cell vehicles (see Ball 2002b) . Levy and Rothenberg (2002) argue that differing expectations of technological solutions account for these varying (but converging) strategies-an argument also applicable to differences in renewable energy investments among energy companies.
The electric power sector, while not as uniformly global, has been closely involved in negotiations and Kyoto mechanisms. Power firms in Asia, North America and Europe count among the early emissions traders, and a majority of pilot AIJ/CDM schemes have been electricity-focused. The electricity generation sector has also been well represented in NGO partnerships, the World Bank PCF, and the CCX design. Interestingly, the more regional scope of the sector may match somewhat with the initial fragmentation of the trading and offset markets. Prospects for convergence are enhanced by electricity firms' experiences with SO 2 trading, but hindered by domestic pressures to insulate the coal industry from restrictions on carbon emissions.
Other industrial sectors engaged with the Kyoto negotiations and mechanisms include chemicals, electronics, agriculture and forest products. These sectors are less direct contributors to climate change than the previous sectors, and have generally more narrow mitigation opportunities (i.e. agricultural or forestry offsets, HFC [hydrofluorocarbon] or PFC [perfluorocarbon] reductions). Though it is difficult to generalise across such a diverse sector, there appears to be relatively less divergence here, and firms such as DuPont and STMicroelectronics have been among the leading advocates for global rules and mechanisms.
The financial services sector exhibits important internal and regional differences. European-based insurers and reinsurers-Munich Re, Swiss Re, Lloyd's of London, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and ING-have been vocal proponents of emissions controls and are pursuing trading opportunities. Their American counterparts, by contrast, have taken a passive approach, partly from fear of losing clients resistant to climate policies. In a study of American banks and insurers such as Bank of America, Chase Manhattan and AIG, van de Woerd et al. (2000) conclude that these firms 'seem to have no vision on the role financial institutions could play to combat greenhouse gas emissions'.
The internationalisation of financial services may yet encourage convergence, in turn exerting influence on other sectors. Credit-rating agencies have begun to include GHG programmes in analysis of environmental risk factors. In May 2002, the Carbon Disclosure Project, supported by institutional investors representing $4 trillion in assets and including Credit Suisse, Merrill Lynch and UBS, announced it had petitioned 500 large corporations to quantify their greenhouse gas emissions and plans for reducing them.
According to a 2002 report commissioned by UNEP on climate change and the financial sector, several factors prevent financial institutions from taking a more proactive stance. Many are unaware of the gravity of the issue or see no financial connection; policy uncertainty has deterred early engagement; lack of information on corporate emissions and strategies hampers integration of the climate issue into financial assessments; and uncertainties about alternative-energy technologies and emissions markets deter investors. The report urges financial institutions to become more familiar with these threats, incorporate climate considerations into their processes, and work closely with policy-makers in developing mitigation strategies (UNEP 2002) .
Sectoral and regional differences in corporate strategy thus reflect varying interpretations of the technological, economic and policy dimensions of climate change. A strong case can be, and has been, made that economic and competitive considerations will exert pressure toward convergence within sectors and across regions. But it is likely that one will still, for some time, be able to identify groups of front-runners, followers, and laggards. Furthermore, additional corporate activities, and lessons from these experiments, are critical inputs for shaping implementation policy. Any overview of corporate responses to climate change is therefore incomplete without discussion of leadership as a strategic-and currently under-utilised-option.
The leadership lacuna
Defining and assessing corporate 'leadership' on climate change is a relative and somewhat subjective undertaking. Nonetheless, a brief overview of three companiesDuPont, BP and Shell-may provide some explanation of the motivations for a firm to assume a leadership position on the issue. It may also permit early analysis as to whether the benefits of leadership in an uncertain policy environment merit the risks.
DuPont has exhibited leadership on the climate issue in several ways. The firm set a target of a 65% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions between 1990 and 2010, and has reportedly achieved a 50% cut, mainly through improved nylon manufacturing methods. It also aims to hold total energy use flat at 1990 levels and derive 10% of global energy use from renewable resources by 2010. And DuPont is a prominent member of the WBCSD and Pew Center, advocating sensible climate policies (Dunn and Flavin 2002) .
The early trading efforts of BP and Shell also represent leadership forays. Since 1998, both firms have established targets for reducing greenhouse gases from operations by 10% below 1990 levels (with respective target dates of 2010 and 2002), established internal cap-and-trade programmes, and assumed leading roles in shaping and executing national and international trading. Both have joined the UK trading scheme, and Shell's new trading business is also exploring CDM opportunities through the Dutch and other programmes (see Shell International 2002) .
The BP target reportedly unleashed efforts to learn about trading: one manager commented: 'Do not underestimate the power of preemptive, aspirational target-setting. The role of leadership is to invent actions that naturally have the consequence of transforming people's thinking' (Harvard Business School 2001) . In 2001, the firm traded over 4.55 million tonnes of CO 2 e at an average price of $7.60 per tonne (BP 2002) . In March 2002, BP announced it had reached its emissions reduction target eight years ahead of schedule at no net cost, primarily through energy-efficiency measures such as reduced flaring and venting (BP 2002) . Speaking at Stanford Business School, Chief Executive John Browne (2002) observed that the cost of precautionary action had been 'clearly lower than many feared', that additional incentives were needed, and that BP sought to maintain 'our leadership position' in climate action. Browne has committed BP to containing its net emissions at 2001 levels through 2012, by means of further energy-efficiency improvements, the use of cleaner fuels and the application of flexible mechanisms.
While such a leadership position entails real risks and unclear benefits, the early experiments of BP and others are likely to yield important lessons for future policy design. For example, BP experienced price volatility with its internal trading system-a problem related to restrictions on the banking of permits, which led to extreme supply highs and lows. Subsequent policy changes to improve banking flexibility evened out this volatility (Natsource 2002).
As the BP experience suggests, real-world corporate experience will be an invaluable input to the debate over the actual costs and benefits of reducing emissions. It is not unreasonable to expect that, over time, managers will prove the pessimistic economists to be mostly wrong. One can also anticipate that a handful of early movers will seek competitive advantage by shaping the rules of the game. But whether the broader corporate world will become more proactively engaged in shaping future climate policies is an open question. Until this occurs, potential leaders may be deterred from stepping into the turbulent waters of the early greenhouse gas market.
At the 2000 World Economic Forum in Davos, corporate leaders voted climate change the most pressing issue confronting the global business community. Yet, as Packard and Reinhardt (2000) argue in the Harvard Business Review, in reality many executives, finding the climate issue so complex, have found it easier to adopt a defensive or waitand-see stance. The authors urge executives to 'encourage a regulatory climate that will be stable and predictable-and therefore friendly to investment-over the long term'. That is not the regulatory climate we have today, and any regulatory climate change seen thus far has taken place more in spite of than because of corporate pressure. It took over half a century for business and political leaders to collectively build a workable global trade regime. Corporate leaders face a commensurate challenge in helping to build an effective, sustainable global climate regime-a challenge they have yet to fully embrace.
